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Abstract
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has been used for decades as a model of behavioural interactions.
From the celebrated performance of Tit for Tat, to the introduction of the zero-determinant strategies,
to the use of sophisticated structures such as neural networks, the literature has been exploring the
performance of strategies in the game for years. The results of the literature, however, have been relying
on the performance of specific strategies in a finite number of tournaments. This manuscript evaluates
195 strategies’ effectiveness in more than 40000 tournaments. The top ranked strategies are presented,
and moreover, the impact of features on their success are analysed using machine learning techniques.
The analysis determines that the cooperation ratio of a strategy in a given tournament compared to the
mean and median cooperator is the most important feature. The conclusions are distinct for different
types of tournaments. For instance a strategy with a theory of mind would aim to be the mean/median
cooperator in standard tournaments, whereas in tournaments with probabilistic ending it would aim to
cooperate 10% of the times the median cooperator did.
1 Background
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) is a repeated two player game that models behavioural interactions,
and more specifically, interactions where self-interest clashes with collective interest. At each turn of the
game both players, simultaneously and independently, decide between cooperation (C) and defection (D)
whilst having memory of their prior interactions. The payoffs for each player, at each turn, is influenced by
their own choice and the choice of the other player. The payoffs of the game are generally defined by:
(
R S
T P
)
where T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. The most common values used in the literature [17] are
R = 3, P = 1, T = 5, S = 0. These values are also used in this work.
Conceptualising strategies and understanding the best way of playing the game has been of interest to the
scientific community since the formulation of the game in 1950 [29]. Following the computer tournaments
of Axelrod in the 1980’s [15, 16], a strategy’s performance in a round robin computer tournament became
a common evaluation technique for newly designed strategies. Today more than 200 strategies exist in the
literature and several tournaments, following on from Axelrod’s, have been undertaken [20, 35, 39, 59, 60].
In the 80’s, Axelrod performed two computer tournaments [15, 16]. The contestants were strategies submitted
in the form of computer code. They competed against all other entries, a copy of themselves and a random
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strategy. The winner was decided on the average score a strategy achieved. The winner of both tournaments
was the simple strategy Tit For Tat which cooperated on the first turn and then simply copied the previous
action of it’s opponent. Due to the strategy’s strong performance in both tournaments, and moreover in a
series of evolutionary experiments [17], Tit For Tat was thought to be the most robust basic strategy in the
IPD.
However, further research proved that the strategy had weaknesses, and more specifically, it was shown that
the strategy suffered in environments with noise [20, 28, 49, 58]. This was mainly due to the strategy’s lack of
generosity and contrition. The strategy was quick to punish a defection, and in a noisy environment it could
lead to a repeated cycle of defections and cooperations. Some new strategies, more robust in tournaments
with noise, were soon introduced and became the new protagonists of the game. These include Nice and
Forgiving [20], Pavlov [51] and Generous Tit For Tat [52].
In 2004, a 20th Anniversary Iterated Prisoner Dilemma Tournament took place with 233 entries. This time the
winning strategy was not designed on a reciprocity based approach but on a mechanism of teams [26, 27, 56].
A team from Southampton University took advantage of the fact that a participant was allowed to submit
multiple strategies. They submitted a total of 60 strategies that could recognise each other and colluded
to increase one members score. This resulted with three of the strategies to be ranked in the top spots.
The performance of the Southampton University team received mixed attention, though they had won the
tournament as stated in [25] ”technically this strategy violates the spirit of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which
assumes that the two prisoners cannot communicate with one another”.
Another set of IPD strategies that have received a lot of attention are the zero-determinant strategies
(ZDs) [54]. By forcing a linear relationship between the payoffs ZDs can ensure that they will never re-
ceive less than their opponents. The American Mathematical Society’s news section stated that “the world
of game theory is currently on fire”. ZDs are indeed a set of mathematically unique strategies and robust
in pairwise interactions, however, their simplicity and extortionate behaviour have been tested. In [35] a
tournament containing over 200 strategies, including ZDs, was ran and none of them ranked in top spots.
Instead, the top ranked strategies were a set of trained strategies based on lookup tables [14], hidden markov
models [35] and finite state automata [47].
Though only a select pieces of work have been discussed, the IPD literature is rich, and new strategies and
competitions are being published every year [34]. The question, however, still remains the same: what is the
best way to play the game? Compared to other works, whereas a few selected strategies are evaluated on a
small number of tournaments, this manuscript evaluates the performance of 195 strategies in 45686 tourna-
ments. These tournaments do not consist of just standard round robin tournaments, but also tournaments
with noise and tournaments with a probabilistic ending. The later part of the paper, evaluates the impact
of features on the performance of the strategies using modern machine learning techniques. These features
include measures regarding a strategy’s behaviour and measures regarding the tournaments. The data set
used in this work has been made publicly available [33] and can be used for further analysis and insights.
The different tournament types as well as the data collection, which is made possible due to an open source
package called Axelrod-Python, are covered in Section 2. Section 3, focuses on the best performing strategies
for each type of tournament and overall. Section 4, explores the traits which contribute to good performance,
and finally the results are summarised in Section 5. This manuscripts uses several parameters. These are
introduced in the following sections, however, the full set of parameters and their definitions are given in
Appendix A. A list of all strategies including citations of their origins is given in Appendix B.
2
2 Data collection
For the purposes of this manuscript a data set containing results of IPD tournaments has been generated
and is available at [33]. This was done using the open source package Axelrod-Python library [4] (APL), and
more specifically, version 3.0.0. APL allows for different types of IPD computer tournaments to be simulated
whilst containing a list of over 180 strategies. Most of these are strategies described in the literature with a
few exceptions being strategies that have been contributed specifically to the package. This paper make use
of 195 strategies implemented in version 3.0.0. A list of the strategies is given in the Appendix B. Although
APL features several tournament types, this work considers standard, noisy, probabilistic ending and noisy
probabilistic ending tournaments.
Standard tournaments, are tournaments similar to that of Axelrod’s in [15]. There are N strategies
which all play an iterated game of n number of turns against each other. Note that self interactions are
not included. Similarly, noisy tournaments have N strategies and n number of turns, but at each turn
there is a probability pn that a player’s action will be flipped. Probabilistic ending tournaments, are
of size N and after each turn a match between strategies ends with a given probability pe. Finally, noisy
probabilistic ending tournaments have both a noise probability pn and an ending probability pe. For
smoothing the simulated results a tournament is repeated for k number of times. This was allowed to vary
in order to evaluate the effect of smoothing. The winner of each tournament is based on the average score a
strategy achieved and not by the number of wins.
The process of collecting tournament results implemented in this manuscript is described by Algorithm 1.
For each trial a random size N is selected, and from the 195 strategies a random list of N strategies is chosen.
For the given list of strategies a standard, a noisy, a probabilistic ending and a noisy probabilistic ending
tournament are performed and repeated k times. The parameters for the tournaments, as well as the number
of repetitions, are selected once for each trial. The parameters and their respective minimum and maximum
values are given by Table 1.
parameter parameter explanation min value max value
N number of strategies 3 195
k number of repetitions 10 100
n number of turns 1 200
pn probability of flipping action at each turn 0 1
pe probability of match ending in the next turn 0 1
Table 1: Data collection; parameters’ values
The source code for the data collection, as well as the source code for the analysis, which will be discussed
in the following sections, have been written following best practices [5, 21]. It has been packaged and is
available here.
A total of 11420 trials of Algorithm 1 have been run. For each trial the results for 4 different tournaments were
collected, thus a total of 45686 (11420×4) tournament results have been retrieved. Each tournament outputs
a result summary in the form of Table 2. Each strategy have participated on average in 5154 tournaments of
each type. The strategy with the maximum participation in each tournament type is Inverse Punisher with
5639 entries. The strategy with the minimum entries is EvolvedLookerUp 1 1 1 which was selected in 4693
trials.
The result summary, Table 2, has N rows because each row contains information for each strategy that
participated in the tournament. The information includes the strategy’s rank, median score, the rate with
which the strategy cooperated (Cr), its match win count and the probability that the strategy cooperated in
the opening move. Moreover, the probabilities of a strategy being in any of the four states (CC,CD,DC,DD),
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Algorithm 1: Data collection Algorithm
foreach seed ∈ [0, 11420] do
N ← randomly select integer ∈ [Nmin, Nmax];
players← randomly select N players;
k ← randomly select integer ∈ [kmin, kmax];
n← randomly select integer ∈ [nmin, nmax];
pn ← randomly select float ∈ [pnmin, pnmax];
pe ← randomly select float ∈ [pemin, pemax];
result standard ← Axelrod.tournament(players, n, k);
result noisy ← Axelrod.tournament(players, n, pn, k);
result probabilistic ending ← Axelrod.tournament(players, pe, k);
result noisy probabilistic ending ← Axelrod.tournament(players, pn, pe, k);
return result standard, result noisy, result probabilistic ending, result noisy probabilistic ending ;
and the rate of which the strategy cooperated after each state. A feature that has been manually included
is the normalised rank. The rank of a given strategy, denoted as R, can vary between 0 and N − 1. Thus,
the normalised rank, denoted as r, is calculated as a strategy’s rank divided by the tournament’s size N − 1.
In the next section the performance of these strategies is evaluated based on their normalised rank.
Rates
Rank Name Median score Cooperation rating (Cr) Win Initial C CC CD DC DD CC to C CD to C DC to C DD to C
0 EvolvedLookerUp2 2 2 2.97 0.705 28.0 1.0 0.639 0.066 0.189 0.106 0.836 0.481 0.568 0.8
1 Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05 2.875 0.697 21.0 1.0 0.676 0.020 0.135 0.168 0.985 0.571 0.392 0.07
2 PSO Gambler 1 1 1 2.874 0.684 23.0 1.0 0.651 0.034 0.152 0.164 1.000 0.283 0.000 0.136
3 PSO Gambler Mem1 2.861 0.706 23.0 1.0 0.663 0.042 0.145 0.150 1.000 0.510 0.000 0.122
4 Winner12 2.835 0.682 20.0 1.0 0.651 0.031 0.141 0.177 1.000 0.441 0.000 0.462
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 2: Output result of a single tournament.
3 Top ranked strategies
This section evaluates the performance of 195 IPD strategies. The performance of each strategy is evaluated
in four tournament types, which were presented in Section 2, followed by an evaluation of their performance
over all the 45686 simulated tournaments of this work.
Each strategy participated in multiple tournaments of the same type (on average 5154). For example Tit For
Tat participated in a total of 5114 tournaments of each type. The strategy’s normalised rank distribution
in these is given in Figure 1. A value of r = 0 corresponds to a strategy winning the tournament where
a value of r = 1 corresponds to the strategy coming last. Because of the strategies’ multiple entries their
performance is evaluated based on the median normalised rank denoted as r¯.
The top 15 strategies for each tournament type based on r¯ are given in Table 3.
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Figure 1: Tit For Tat’s r distribution in tournaments. The best performance of the strategy has been in
standard tournaments where it achieved a r¯ of 0.34.
Standard Noisy Probabilistic ending Noisy probabilistic ending
Name r¯ Name r¯ Name r¯ Name r¯
0 Evolved HMM 5 0.00667 Grumpy 0.14020 Fortress4 0.01266 Alternator 0.30370
1 Evolved FSM 16 0.00995 e 0.19388 Defector 0.01429 φ 0.30978
2 EvolvedLookerUp2 2 2 0.01064 Tit For 2 Tats 0.20617 Better and Better 0.01587 e 0.31250
3 Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05 0.01667 Slow Tit For Two Tats 0.20962 Tricky Defector 0.01875 pi 0.31686
4 PSO Gambler 2 2 2 0.02143 Cycle Hunter 0.21538 Fortress3 0.02174 Limited Retaliate 0.35263
5 Evolved ANN 0.02878 Risky QLearner 0.22222 Gradual Killer 0.02532 Anti Tit For Tat 0.35431
6 Evolved ANN 5 0.03390 Retaliate 3 0.22887 Aggravater 0.02778 Retaliate 3 0.35563
7 PSO Gambler 1 1 1 0.03704 Cycler CCCCCD 0.23507 Raider 0.03077 Limited Retaliate 3 0.35563
8 Evolved FSM 4 0.04891 Retaliate 2 0.23913 Cycler DDC 0.04545 Retaliate 0.35714
9 PSO Gambler Mem1 0.05036 Defector Hunter 0.24038 Hard Prober 0.05128 Retaliate 2 0.35767
10 Winner12 0.06011 Retaliate 0.24177 SolutionB1 0.06024 Limited Retaliate 2 0.36134
11 Fool Me Once 0.06140 Hard Tit For 2 Tats 0.25000 Meta Minority 0.06077 Hopeless 0.36842
12 DBS 0.07143 ShortMem 0.25286 Bully 0.06081 Arrogant QLearner 0.40651
13 DoubleCrosser 0.07200 Limited Retaliate 3 0.25316 Fool Me Forever 0.07080 Cautious QLearner 0.40909
14 BackStabber 0.07519 Limited Retaliate 0.25706 EasyGo 0.07101 Fool Me Forever 0.41764
Table 3: Top performances for each tournament type based on r¯.
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In standard tournaments 10 out of the 15 top strategies are introduced in [35]. These are strategies based on
finite state automata (FSM), hidden markov models (HMM), artificial neural networks (ANN), lookup tables
(LookerUp) and stochastic lookup tables (Gambler) that have been trained using reinforcement learning
algorithms (evolutionary and particle swarm algorithms). They have been trained to perform well against
the strategies in APL in a standard tournament, thus their performance in the specific setting was anticipated.
DoubleCrosser, and Fool Me Once, are strategies not from the literature but from the APL. DoubleCrosser
is a strategy that makes use of the number of turns because it is set to defect on the last two rounds. The
strategy was expected to not perform as well in tournaments where the number of turns is not specified, but
the strategy did not perform well in tournaments with noise either. Finally, Winner 12 [46] and DBS [13] are
both from the the literature. DBS is strategy specifically designed for noisy environments, however, it ranks
highly only in standard ones.
Figure 2 gives the distributions of r for the top ranked strategies. The distributions are skewed towards zero
and the highest median, of the top 15 strategies, is at 0.075. This indicates that the top ranked strategies
perform well in any given standard tournament, regardless of the opponents and the number of turns.
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Figure 2: r distributions of top 15 strategies in standard tournaments.
The top strategies in noisy tournaments are shown in Figure 3. These include deterministic strategies, such as
Tit For 2 Tats [16], Slow Tit For Two Tats [4], Hard Tit For 2 Tats [60] and Cycler CCCCCD, and strategies
which decide their actions based on the cooperations to defections ratio, such as ShortMem [23], Grumpy
and e [4]. Slow Tit For Two Tats is the same strategy as Tit For 2 Tats, and at the time of writing this
manuscript the contributors of [4] made a new release where the strategy has been removed. However, for the
purpose of this work the strategy is kept. The Retaliate and Limited Retaliate strategies are implemented in
APL by the same contributor. They are strategies designed to defect if the opponent has tricked them more
often than x% of the times that they have done the same. Finally, in 4th and 9th place are Hunter strategies
which try to extort strategies that play cyclically and defectors.
From Figure 3, it is evident that the normalised rank distributions in noisy environments are more variant
with higher medians compared to standard tournaments. The distributions are bimodal. This indicates that
although the top ranked strategies mainly performed well, there are several tournaments that they ranked
in the bottom half. The bimodality of the r distributions can be explained by Figure 3 which gives the
r distributions for the top 6 strategies over the noise probability pn. Note that for pn = 0.5 a strategy
corresponds to a random player and for pn = 1 a strategy is behaving in the exact opposite way than its
design.
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Figure 3: r distributions for best performed strategies in noisy tournaments.
From Figure 4 it is evident that the strategies highly ranked in noisy environments did so because of their
performance in tournaments with pn > 0.5. In tournaments with a noise probability lower than 0.5 the
strategies performed poorly which is why their r distributions are bimodal. If during the data collection a pn
strictly less 0.5 was considered then the top ranked strategies would be different. There are a total of 5661
trials where pn < 0.5 and the top ranked strategies are given in Table 4. The median ranks are lower than
before and the top spots are mainly overtaken by Meta strategies which include NMWE deterministic and
NMWE Long Memory. The Meta strategies [4] create a team of strategies for themselves and choose to play
as a member of their team based on their scores against a given opponent.
Name r¯
MEM2 0.06135
Spiteful Tit For Tat 0.06344
Nice Meta Winner 0.06620
Grudger 0.06667
Meta Winner Long Memory 0.07339
Forgiver 0.07362
Fool Me Once 0.07362
Meta Winner 0.07487
Meta Winner Memory One 0.07621
Meta Winner Finite Memory 0.07692
Meta Winner Deterministic 0.07792
NMWE Deterministic 0.08696
NMWE Long Memory 0.08696
CollectiveStrategy 0.08696
Defector 0.08889
Table 4: Top performances in 5661 noisy tournaments where pn < 0.5.
The 15 top ranked strategies in probabilistic ending tournaments include Fortress 3, Fortress 4 (both in-
troduced in [11]), Raider [12] and Solution B1 [12], which are strategies based on finite state automata
introduced by Daniel and Wendy Ashlock. These strategies have been evolved using reinforcement learning,
however, there were trained to maximise their payoffs in tournaments with fixed turns (150 specifically)
and not in probabilistic ending ones. In probabilistic ending tournaments it appears that the top ranks are
mostly occupied by defecting strategies. These include Better and Better, Gradual Killer, Hard Prober (all
from [1]), Bully (Reverse Tit For Tat) [50] and Defector. Thus, it’s surprisingly that EasyGo and Fool Me
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Figure 4: r distributions for top 6 strategies in noisy tournaments over the probability of noisy (pn).
Forever which are strategies that will defect until their opponent defect, then they will cooperate until the
end, ranked 14th and 15th. Upon inspection, it was found that they are actually the same strategy. This
was not known to the authors at the time of data collection. Figure 5 verifies that their performance is the
same. Both strategies have repeatedly ranked highly and there are cases for which they were the winners of
the tournament.
The distributions of the normalised rank in probabilistic ending tournaments, shown in Figure 5, are less
variant than those of noisy tournaments. The medians of the top 15 strategies are lower than 0.1 and the
distributions are skewed towards 0. Though the large difference between the means and the medians indicates
some outliers, the strategies have overall performed well in the probabilistic ending tournaments that they
participated.
The distributions of r for the top 6 strategies in probabilistic ending tournaments over pe are given in Figure 6.
Figure 6 shows that the 6 strategies start of with a high median rank, however, their ranked decreased as
the the probability of the game ending increased and at the point of pe = 0.1 they became the dominant
strategies in their respective tournaments. In essence, what is demonstrated is that defecting strategies did
better when the likelihood of the game ending in the next turn increased, which is inline with the Folk
Theorem [31]. If tournaments where the probability of the game ending was less than 0.1 were considered
then the the top ranked spots are not dominated by just defecting strategies anymore, as shown in Table 5.
Instead the effective strategies are now the Meta strategies, trained strategies, Grudger [4] and Spiteful Tit
for Tat [1].
In tournaments with both noise and an unspecified number of turns several of the top ranked strategies
are strategies that were highly ranked in noisy tournaments. However, strategies from the top ranks in
probabilistic ending tournaments did not rank highly here. Other strategies include pi, φ which are based on
the same approach as e. The distributions of r shown in Figure 7 have the largest median values compared
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Figure 5: r distributions for best performed strategies in probabilistic ending tournaments.
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Figure 6: r distributions for top 6 strategies in probabilistic ending tournaments over pe.
to the top rank strategies of the other tournament types. A subset of noisy probabilistic ending tournaments
has been considered such that pe < 0.1 and pn < 0.5. The top ranked strategies are given in Table 6 and it is
shown that the Meta strategies which performed well in noisy tournaments with pn < 0.5, perform well once
again even the number of turns is not specified. Moreover, several strategies that did well in probabilistic
ending tournaments such as Fortress 3, Fortress 4, Defector and Better and Better are effective here as well.
Up till now, the performances of the 195 strategies have been evaluated for individual tournament types. The
distributions of r for the tournament types indicate that for probabilistic ending and standard tournaments
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Name r¯
Evolved FSM 16 0.00000
Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05 0.01266
MEM2 0.02715
Evolved HMM 5 0.04423
EvolvedLookerUp2 2 2 0.04870
Spiteful Tit For Tat 0.05958
Nice Meta Winner 0.06842
NMWE Finite Memory 0.06923
Grudger 0.06985
NMWE Deterministic 0.07018
NMWE Long Memory 0.07407
Nice Meta Winner Ensemble 0.07595
EvolvedLookerUp1 1 1 0.07692
NMWE Memory One 0.08000
NMWE Stochastic 0.08475
Table 5: Top performances in 1139 probabilistic ending tournaments with pe < 0.1
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Figure 7: r distributions for best performed strategies in noisy probabilistic ending tournaments.
Name r¯
Defector 0.00552
Better and Better 0.01055
Aggravater 0.01399
Fortress4 0.02100
Tricky Defector 0.03857
Meta Winner Long Memory 0.04878
Meta Winner Memory One 0.04955
Meta Winner Finite Memory 0.04972
Meta Winner Stochastic 0.05128
Meta Winner Deterministic 0.05195
Meta Winner 0.05333
Meta Winner Ensemble 0.05882
Fortress3 0.06956
CollectiveStrategy 0.07692
Prober 3 0.08018
Table 6: Top performances in 568 probabilistic ending tournaments with pe < 0.1 and pn < 0.5.
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successful strategies do exist. For these settings, the top 15 strategies have frequently ranked in the top spots
with only a few exceptions. Contrarily, it appears that noise cause variation in the normalised ranks, and
the strategies can always guarantee a spot in the top ranks.
The data set considered in this work, described in Section 2, contains a total of 45686 tournament results.
For this part of the manuscript the strategies are ranked based on the median normalised rank they achieved
over the entire data set. The top 15 strategies are given in Table 7 and their normalised rank distributions
are given in Figure 8.
Name r¯
Limited Retaliate 3 0.28609
Retaliate 3 0.29630
Retaliate 2 0.30250
Limited Retaliate 2 0.30328
Limited Retaliate 0.31000
Retaliate 0.31707
BackStabber 0.32381
DoubleCrosser 0.33136
Nice Meta Winner 0.34921
PSO Gambler 2 2 2 Noise 05 0.35146
Grudger 0.35156
Evolved HMM 5 0.35714
NMWE Memory One 0.35714
Nice Meta Winner Ensemble 0.35870
Forgetful Fool Me Once 0.35884
Table 7: Top performances over all the tournaments
The top ranks include strategies that have been previously mentioned. The set of Retaliate strategies occupy
the top spots followed by BackStabber and DoubleCrosser. The distributions of the Retaliate strategies have
no statistical difference. Thus, in an IPD tournament where the type is not specified, playing as any of the
Retaliate strategies seems like a good approach. DoubleCrosser performed well in standard tournaments and
the strategy is just an extension of BackStabber. It should be noted that these strategies can be characterised
as “cheaters”. The source code of the strategies allows them to known the number of turns in a match (if
they are specified). PSO Gambler and Evolved HMM 5 are trained strategies introduced in [35] and Nice
Meta Winner and NMWE Memory One are strategies based on teams. Grudger is a strategy from Axelrod’s
original tournament and Forgetful Fool Me Once is based on the same approach as Grudger. Overall the top 15
strategies are fundamentally different. Some are cheaters, some are complex, others are simple deterministic
strategies and strategies based on teams. The results of 45686 tournaments used in this work imply the
following: there is not a single type of strategy which can performance well in any IPD interaction.
This section presented the winning strategies in a series of IPD tournaments. In standard tournaments
the top spots were dominated by complex strategies that had been trained using reinforcement learning
techniques. In noisy environments, whether the number of turns was fixed or not, the winning strategies
were deterministic strategies designed to defect if the opponent tricked them more than a current amount
of the times that they had tricked their opponent. However, if a value of noise strictly less than 0.5 was
considered, then the successful strategies were strategies based on the behaviour of many strategies. In
probabilistic ending tournaments most of the highly ranked strategies were defecting strategies and trained
finite state automata, all by the authors of [11, 12]. These strategies ranked high due to their performance
in tournaments where the probability of the game ending after each turn was bigger than 0.1. Finally the
performance of all 195 strategies over the 45686 tournaments in this manuscript was assessed on r¯. The top
ranked strategies were a mixture of behaviours that did well in standard tournaments and tournaments with
noise, as well as a few strategies based on teams.
11
Lim
ite
d 
Re
ta
lia
te
 3
Re
ta
lia
te
 3
Re
ta
lia
te
 2
Lim
ite
d 
Re
ta
lia
te
 2
Lim
ite
d 
Re
ta
lia
te
Re
ta
lia
te
Ba
ck
St
ab
be
r
Do
ub
le
Cr
os
se
r
Ni
ce
 M
et
a 
W
in
ne
r
PS
O 
Ga
m
bl
er
 2
_2
_2
 N
oi
se
 0
5
Gr
ud
ge
r
Ev
ol
ve
d 
HM
M
 5
NM
W
E 
M
em
or
y 
On
e
Ni
ce
 M
et
a 
W
in
ne
r E
ns
em
bl
e
Fo
rg
et
fu
l F
oo
l M
e 
On
ce
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Top performances in overall tournaments
Figure 8: r distributions for best performed strategies in the data set [33].
The results of this section imply that successful strategies for specific settings exist for an IPD tournament.
The top ranked strategies in both standard tournaments and tournaments with probabilistic ending, managed
to rank in the top 10% of the tournament most of the times. Strategies in noisy environments demonstrated
that no strategy can be consistently successful, except if the value of noise is constrained to less than a half.
Overall, there has been not a single strategy that has shown to perform well in more than one setting. The
aim of the next section is to understand the features that made these strategies successful, in each setting
separately but also overall.
4 Evaluation of performance
The aim of this section is to explore the features that contribute to a strategy’s successful performance.
The features explored are measures regarding a strategy’s behaviour, along with measures regarding the
tournaments the strategies competed in. These are given in Table 8.
APL makes use of classifiers to classify strategies according to various dimensions. These determine whether
a strategy is stochastic or deterministic, whether it makes use of the number of turns or the game’s payoffs.
The memory usage feature is calculated as the memory size of strategy (which is specified in the strategies
implementation in the APL) divide by the number of turns. For example, Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05 has a
memory size of 16 and participated in a tournament where n was 134. In the given tournament Evolved FSM
16 Noise 05 has a memory usage of 0.119. For tournaments with a probabilistic ending the number of turns
was not collected, so the memory usage feature is not used for probabilistic ending tournaments. The SSE is
a feature introduced in [41] which shows how close a strategy is to behaving as a ZDs, and subsequently, in
an extortionate way. The method identifies the ZDs closest to a given strategy and calculates the algebraic
distance between them, defined as SSE. A SSE value of 1 indicates no extortionate behaviour at all whereas
a value of 0 indicates that a strategy is behaving a ZDs. The rest of the features considered are the CC to C,
CD to C, DC to C, and DD to C rates as well as cooperating ratio of a strategy. The minimum, maximum,
medium and median cooperating ratios of each tournament are also included, and finally the number of turns,
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feature feature explanation source value type min value max value
stochastic If a strategy is stochastic strategy classifier from APL boolean Na Na
makes use of game If a strategy makes used of the game information strategy classifier from APL boolean Na Na
makes use of length If a strategy makes used of the number of turns strategy classifier from APL boolean Na Na
memory usage The memory size of a strategy divided by the number of turns memory size from APL float 0 1
SSE A measure of how far a strategy is from ZD behaviour method described in [41] float 0 1
max cooperating rate (Cmax) The biggest cooperating rate in a given tournament result summary float 0 1
min cooperating rate (Cmin) The smallest cooperating rate in a given tournament result summary float 0 1
median cooperating rate (Cmedian) The median cooperating rate in a given tournament result summary float 0 1
mean cooperating rate (Cmean) The mean cooperating rate in a given tournament result summary float 0 1
Cr / Cmax A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the maximum result summary float 0 1
Cr / Cmin A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the minimum result summary float 0 1
Cr / Cmedian A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the median result summary float 0 1
Cr / Cmean A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the mean result summary float 0 1
Cr The cooperating ratio of a strategy result summary float 0 1
CC to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after a mutual cooperation result summary float 0 1
CD to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after being betrayed by the opponent result summary float 0 1
DC to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after betraying the opponent result summary float 0 1
DD to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after a mutual defection result summary float 0 1
pn The probability of a player’s action being flip at each interaction trial summary float 0 1
n The number of turns trial summary integer 1 200
pe The probability of a match ending in the next turn trial summary float 0 1
N The number of strategies in the tournament trial summary integer 3 195
k The number of repetitions of a given tournament trial summary integer 10 100
Table 8: The features which are included in the performance evaluation analysis.
the number of strategies, the number of repetitions and the probabilities of noise and the game ending are
also included.
Table 9 shows the correlation coefficients between the features of Table 8 the median score and the median
normalised rank. Note that the correlation for the classifiers is not included because they are binary variables
and they will be evaluated using a different method. The correlation coefficients for all the features in Table 8
against themselves have also been calculated and a graphical representation can be found in the Appendix C.
Standard Noisy Probabilistic ending Noisy probabilistic ending Overall
r median score r median score r median score r median score r median score
CC to C rate -0.501 0.501 0.414 -0.504 0.408 -0.323 0.260 0.022 -0.501 0.501
CD to C rate 0.226 -0.199 0.456 -0.330 0.320 -0.017 0.205 -0.220 0.226 -0.199
Cr -0.323 0.384 0.711 -0.678 0.714 -0.832 0.579 -0.135 -0.323 0.384
Cr / Cmax -0.323 0.381 0.616 -0.551 0.714 -0.833 0.536 -0.116 -0.323 0.381
Cr / Cmean -0.331 0.358 0.731 -0.740 0.721 -0.861 0.649 -0.621 -0.331 0.358
Cr / Cmedian -0.331 0.353 0.652 -0.669 0.712 -0.852 0.330 -0.466 -0.331 0.353
Cr / Cmin 0.109 -0.080 -0.358 0.250 -0.134 0.150 -0.368 0.113 0.109 -0.080
Cmax -0.000 0.049 0.000 0.023 -0.000 0.046 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 0.049
Cmean -0.000 0.229 -0.000 0.271 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.690 -0.000 0.229
Cmedian 0.000 0.209 -0.000 0.240 -0.000 0.187 -0.000 0.673 0.000 0.209
Cmin 0.000 0.084 0.000 -0.017 -0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.041 0.000 0.084
DC to C rate 0.127 -0.100 0.509 -0.504 -0.018 0.033 0.341 -0.016 0.127 -0.100
DD to C rate 0.412 -0.396 0.533 -0.436 -0.103 0.176 0.378 -0.263 0.412 -0.396
N 0.000 -0.009 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.009
k 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.002
n 0.000 -0.125 -0.000 -0.024 - - - - 0.000 -0.125
pe - - - - 0.000 0.165 0.000 -0.058 -0.001 0.001
pn - - -0.000 0.207 - - -0.000 -0.650 0.002 -0.000
Make use of game -0.003 -0.022 0.025 -0.082 -0.053 -0.108 0.013 -0.016 -0.003 -0.022
Make use of length -0.158 0.124 0.005 -0.123 -0.025 -0.090 0.014 -0.016 -0.154 0.117
SSE 0.473 -0.452 0.463 -0.337 -0.156 0.223 0.305 -0.259 0.473 -0.452
memory usage -0.082 0.095 -0.007 -0.017 - - - - -0.084 0.095
stochastic 0.006 -0.024 0.022 -0.026 0.002 -0.130 0.021 -0.013 0.006 -0.024
Table 9: Correlations table between the features of Table 8 the normalised rank and the median score.
In standard tournaments the features CC to C, Cr, Cr/Cmax and the cooperating ratio compared to Cmedian
and Cmean have a moderate negative effect on the normalised rank, and a moderate positive on the median
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score. The SSE error and the DD to C have the opposite effects. Thus, in standard tournaments behaving
cooperatively corresponds to a more successful performance. Even though being nice pays off, that’s not
true against defective strategies. Cooperating after a mutual defection lowers a strategy’s success. Figure 9
confirms that the winners of standard tournaments always cooperate after a mutual cooperation and almost
always defects after a mutual defection.
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DD to C rate
Figure 9: Distributions of CC to C and DD to C for the winners in standard tournaments.
Compared to standard tournaments, in both noisy and in probabilistic ending tournaments the higher the
rates of cooperation the lower a strategy’s success and median score. A strategy would want to cooperate
less than both the mean and median cooperator in such settings. In probabilistic ending tournaments the
correlations coefficients have a larger values, indicating a stronger effect. Thus a strategy will be punished
more by it’s cooperative behaviour in probabilistic ending environments, this was seen in Section 4 as well.
The distributions of the Cr of the winners in both tournaments is given by Figure 10. It confirms that the
winners in noisy tournaments cooperated less than 35% of the times and in probabilistic ending tournaments
less than 10%. In noisy probabilistic ending tournaments and in over all the tournaments’ results, the
only features that had a moderate affect are Cr/Cmean, Cr/Cmax and Cr. In such environments cooperative
behaviour appears to be punished by not as much as in noisy and probabilistic ending tournaments.
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Figure 10: Cr distributions of the winners in noisy and in probabilistic ending tournaments.
To further explore the features that contribute to a strategy’s success the performances are divided into
clusters based on whether they were successful or not. A random forest approach [22] is then applied to each
performance to predict the cluster to which it has been assigned to. This allows for the importance of each
feature in the classification to be calculated. In essence, to calculate which are the important features when
one is trying to predict whether a performance was successful or not.
The performances are clustered into successful and unsuccessful clusters based on 4 different approaches.
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More specifically:
• Approach 1: The performances are divided into two clusters based on whether their performance was
in the top 5% of their respective tournaments. Thus, whether r was smaller or larger than 0.05.
• Approach 2: The performances are divided into two clusters based on whether their performance was
in the top 25% of their respective tournaments. Thus, whether r was smaller or larger than 0.25.
• Approach 3: The performances are divided into two clusters based on whether their performance was
in the top 50% of their respective tournaments. Thus, whether r was smaller or larger than 0.50.
• Approach 4: The performances are clustered based on their normalised rank and their median score
by a k−means algorithm [8]. The number of clusters is not deterministically chosen but it is based on
the silhouette coefficients [57].
The random forest method constructs many individual decision trees and the predictions from all trees are
pooled to make the final prediction. The random forest models are trained on a training set of 70% of the
tournaments results. The accuracy of each model based on R2 and the number of clusters for each tournament
type (because in the case of Approach 4 it is not deterministically chosen) are given by Table 10. The out of
the bag error (OOB) [36] has also been calculated. The models fit well, and a high value of both the accuracy
measures on the test data and the OOB error indicate that the model is not over fitting.
Tournament type Clustering Approach Number of clusters R2 training data R2 test data R2 OOB score
standard Approach 1 2 0.998831 0.987041 0.983708
Approach 2 2 0.998643 0.978626 0.969202
Approach 3 2 0.998417 0.985217 0.976538
Approach 4 2 0.998794 0.990677 0.982959
noisy Approach 1 2 0.996677 0.950572 0.935383
Approach 2 2 0.996677 0.950572 0.935383
Approach 3 2 0.996677 0.950572 0.935383
Approach 4 3 0.996677 0.950572 0.935383
probabilistic ending Approach 1 2 0.999592 0.995128 0.992819
Approach 2 2 0.999592 0.995128 0.992819
Approach 3 2 0.999592 0.995128 0.992819
Approach 4 2 0.999592 0.995128 0.992819
noisy probabilistic ending Approach 1 2 0.990490 0.813905 0.791418
Approach 2 2 0.990490 0.813905 0.791418
Approach 3 2 0.990490 0.813905 0.791418
Approach 4 4 0.990490 0.813905 0.791418
over 45686 tournaments Approach 1 2 0.993396 0.913409 0.898059
Approach 2 2 0.993396 0.913409 0.898059
Approach 3 2 0.993396 0.913409 0.898059
Approach 4 3 0.993396 0.913409 0.898059
Table 10: Accuracy metrics for random forest models.
The importance that the features of Table 8 had on each random forest model while the perfomances were
clustered based on the different approaches have been calculated and are given by Figures 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15.
These show that the classifiers stochastic, make use of game and make use of length have no significant effect,
and several of the features that are highlighted by the importance are inline with the correlation results.
Moreover, the smoothing parameter k appears to no have a significant effect either. The most important
features based on the random forest analysis were Cr/Cmedian and Cr/Cmean.
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Figure 11: Importance of features in standard tournaments for different clustering methods.
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Figure 12: Importance of features in noisy tournaments for different clustering methods.
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Figure 13: Importance of features in probabilistic ending tournaments for different clustering methods.
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Figure 14: Importance of features in noisy probabilistic ending tournaments for different clustering methods.
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Figure 15: Importance of features over all the tournaments for different clustering methods.
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The effect of both these features can be further explored. In Figure 16 the distributions of Cr/Cmean and
Cr/Cmedian are given for the winners in standard tournaments. A value of Cr/Cmean = 1 imply that the
cooperating ratio of the winner was the same as the mean/median cooperating ratio of the tournament. In
standard tournaments, the mean for both ratios is 1. Therefore, an effective strategy in standard tourna-
ments was the mean/median cooperator of its respective tournament. In comparison, Figure 17 shows the
distributions of the features for the winners in noisy tournaments where the mean is at 0.67. Thereupon the
winners cooperated 67% of the times the mean/median cooperator did. This analysis is applied to the rest of
the tournaments and the distributions are given by Figures 18, 19 and 20. In a tournament with noisy and
a probabilistic ending the winners cooperated 60%, whereas in settings that the type of the tournament can
vary between the types considered in this work the winners cooperated 67% of the times the mean or median
cooperator did. Finally, in probabilistic ending tournament it has already been mentioned that defecting
strategies prevail and this result is once again confirmed in this section.
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Figure 16: Distributions of Cr/Cmedian and Cr/Cmedian for winners of standard tournaments.
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Figure 17: Distributions of Cr/Cmedian and Cr/Cmedian for winners of noisy tournaments.
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Figure 18: Distributions of Cr/Cmedian and Cr/Cmedian for winners of probabilistic ending tournaments.
In this section the effect of several features, regarding a strategy’s behaviour and the tournament in which it
participated on its performance were presented. This was done using two approaches. Correlation coefficients
and a random forest analysis. The results of these are summarised in the following section.
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Figure 19: Distributions of Cr/Cmedian and Cr/Cmedian for winners of noisy probabilistic ending tournaments.
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Figure 20: Distributions of Cr/Cmedian and Cr/Cmedian for winners of over all the tournaments.
5 Conclusion
This manuscript has explored the performance of 195 strategies of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a
large number of computer tournaments. The results of the analysis demonstrated that, although for specific
tournament types such as standard and probabilistic ending tournaments, dominant strategies exist there is
not a single dominant type of strategies if the environments vary. Moreover, a strategy with a theory of mind
should aim to adapt its behaviour based on the mean and median cooperators and should in general not be
too cooperative.
The 195 strategies used in this manuscript have been mainly from the literature, and they have been accessible
due to an open source software called the Axelrod-Python library. The software was used to generate a total
of 45686 computer tournaments results with different number of strategies and different participants each
time. The data collection was described in Section 2. In Section 3, the tournaments results were used to
present the top performances. The data set contained results from four different settings, and these were
also studied individually. In standard tournaments complex strategies trained using reinforcement learning
ranked in the top spots. Some of these strategies ranked again in the top spots in probabilistic ending
tournaments when a pe of less 0.1 was considered. In probabilistic ending tournaments pe was designed to
vary between 0 and 1. It was demonstrated that for values larger than 0.1, as stated in the Folk Theorem,
defecting strategies were winning the tournaments because there was a high likelihood of the game ending in
the next turn. In tournaments with noise the median ranks of the top 15 strategies had the highest values
and the r distributions were bimodal. The top rank strategies were performing both well and bad, and
this indicates that in noisy tournaments there are not strategies that can guarantee winning. Overall, the
top ranked strategies differed from one tournament type to another and the mechanism behind the winning
strategies were all different. Even strategies designed to perform well in one setting were demonstrated to be
better in others.
Section 4, covered an analysis of performance based on several features associated with a strategy and with
the environments it was competing. The results of this analysis showed that a strategy’s characteristics
such as whether or not it’s stochastic, and the information it used regarding the game had no effect on the
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strategy’s success. The most important features have been those that compared the strategy’s behaviour to
it’s environment. The cooperating ratio of the strategy compared to the mean and median cooperator was
highlighted as the most important feature in the analysis. More specifically, if a strategy were to enter a
tournament with a theory of mind of its environment it would choose to be the median cooperator in standard
tournaments, to cooperate 10% of the time the median cooperator did in probabilistic ending tournaments
and 60% in noisy and noisy probabilistic tournaments. Lastly, if a strategy was aware of the opponents but
not of the setting of the tournament, a strategy would be more likely to be successful if it were to identify
the median cooperator and cooperated 67% of the times that they did.
The data set described in this work contains the largest number of IPD tournaments, to the authors knowl-
edge, and available at [33]. Further data mining could be applied and provide new insights in the field.
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• The Matplotlib library for visualisation [38].
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A A summary of parameters
A summary of the parameters and features used in this work are given by Table 11.
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feature feature explanation
stochastic If a strategy is stochastic
makes use of game If a strategy makes used of the game information
makes use of length If a strategy makes used of the number of turns
memory usage The memory size of a strategy divided by the number of turns
SSE A measure of how far a strategy is from extortionate behaviour
Cmax The biggest cooperating rate in the tournament
Cmin The smallest cooperating rate in the tournament
Cmedian The median cooperating rate in the tournament
Cmean The mean cooperating rate in the tournament
Cr / Cmax A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the maximum
Cr / Cmin A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the minimum
Cr / Cmedian A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the median
Cr / Cmean A strategy’s cooperating rate divided by the mean
Cr The cooperating ratio of a strategy
CC to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after a mutual cooperation
CD to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after being betrayed by the opponent
DC to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after betraying the opponent
DD to C rate The probability a strategy will cooperate after a mutual defection
pn The probability of a player’s action being flip at each interaction
n The number of turns
pe The probability of a match ending in the next turn
N The number of strategies in the tournament
k The number that a given tournament is repeated
Table 11: The features which are included in the performance evaluation analysis.
B List of strategies
The strategies used in this study which are from Axelrod-Python library version 3.0.0.
1. φ [4]
2. pi [4]
3. e [4]
4. ALLCorALLD [4]
5. Adaptive [44]
6. Adaptive Pavlov 2006 [40]
7. Adaptive Pavlov 2011 [44]
8. Adaptive Tit For Tat:
0.5 [61]
9. Aggravater [4]
10. Alexei [3]
11. Alternator [17, 48]
12. Alternator Hunter [4]
13. Anti Tit For Tat [37]
14. AntiCycler [4]
15. Appeaser [4]
16. Arrogant QLearner [4]
17. Average Copier [4]
18. Backstabber [4]
19. Better and Better [1]
20. Bully [50]
21. Calculator [1]
22. Cautious QLearner [4]
23. Champion [16]
24. CollectiveStrategy [2]
25. Contrite Tit For Tat [65]
26. Cooperator [17, 48, 54]
27. Cooperator Hunter [4]
28. Cycle Hunter [4]
29. Cycler CCCCCD [4]
30. Cycler CCCD [4]
31. Cycler CCCDCD [4]
32. Cycler CCD [48]
33. Cycler DC [4]
34. Cycler DDC [48]
35. DBS [13]
36. Davis [15]
37. Defector [17, 48, 54]
38. Defector Hunter [4]
39. Double Crosser [4]
40. Desperate [63]
41. DoubleResurrection [7]
42. Doubler [1]
43. Dynamic Two Tits For
Tat [4]
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44. EasyGo [44, 1]
45. Eatherley [16]
46. Eventual Cycle Hunter [4]
47. Evolved ANN [4]
48. Evolved ANN 5 [4]
49. Evolved ANN 5 Noise 05 [4]
50. Evolved FSM 16 [4]
51. Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05 [4]
52. Evolved FSM 4 [4]
53. Evolved HMM 5 [4]
54. EvolvedLookerUp1 1 1 [4]
55. EvolvedLookerUp2 2 2 [4]
56. Eugine Nier [3]
57. Feld [15]
58. Firm But Fair [30]
59. Fool Me Forever [4]
60. Fool Me Once [4]
61. Forgetful Fool Me Once [4]
62. Forgetful Grudger [4]
63. Forgiver [4]
64. Forgiving Tit For Tat [4]
65. Fortress3 [11]
66. Fortress4 [11]
67. GTFT [32, 51]
68. General Soft Grudger [4]
69. Gradual [19]
70. Gradual Killer [1]
71. Grofman[15]
72. Grudger [15, 18, 19, 63, 44]
73. GrudgerAlternator [1]
74. Grumpy [4]
75. Handshake [55]
76. Hard Go By Majority [48]
77. Hard Go By Majority: 10 [4]
78. Hard Go By Majority: 20 [4]
79. Hard Go By Majority: 40 [4]
80. Hard Go By Majority: 5 [4]
81. Hard Prober [1]
82. Hard Tit For 2 Tats [60]
83. Hard Tit For Tat [62]
84. Hesitant QLearner[4]
85. Hopeless [63]
86. Inverse [4]
87. Inverse Punisher [4]
88. Joss [15, 60]
89. Knowledgeable Worse and
Worse [4]
90. Level Punisher [7]
91. Limited Retaliate 2 [4]
92. Limited Retaliate 3 [4]
93. Limited Retaliate [4]
94. MEM2 [45]
95. Math Constant Hunter [4]
96. Meta Hunter Aggressive [4]
97. Meta Hunter [4]
98. Meta Majority [4]
99. Meta Majority Finite Mem-
ory [4]
100. Meta Majority Long Mem-
ory [4]
101. Meta Majority Memory
One [4]
102. Meta Minority [4]
103. Meta Mixer [4]
104. Meta Winner [4]
105. Meta Winner Determinis-
tic [4]
106. Meta Winner Ensemble [4]
107. Meta Winner Finite Mem-
ory [4]
108. Meta Winner Long Mem-
ory [4]
109. Meta Winner Memory
One [4]
110. Meta Winner Stochastic [4]
111. NMWE Deterministic [4]
112. NMWE Finite Memory [4]
113. NMWE Long Memory [4]
114. NMWE Memory One [4]
115. NMWE Stochastic [4]
116. Naive Prober [44]
117. Negation [62]
118. Nice Average Copier [4]
119. Nice Meta Winner [4]
120. Nice Meta Winner Ensem-
ble [4]
121. Nydegger [15]
122. Omega TFT [40]
123. Once Bitten [4]
124. Opposite Grudger [4]
125. PSO Gambler 1 1 1 [4]
126. PSO Gambler 2 2 2 [4]
127. PSO Gambler 2 2 2 Noise
05 [4]
128. PSO Gambler Mem1 [4]
129. Predator [11]
130. Prober [44]
131. Prober 2 [1]
132. Prober 3 [1]
133. Prober 4 [1]
134. Pun1 [11]
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135. Punisher [4]
136. Raider [12]
137. Random Hunter [4]
138. Random: 0.5 [15, 61]
139. Remorseful Prober [44]
140. Resurrection [7]
141. Retaliate 2 [4]
142. Retaliate 3 [4]
143. Retaliate [4]
144. Revised Downing [15]
145. Ripoff [10]
146. Risky QLearner [4]
147. SelfSteem [24]
148. ShortMem [24]
149. Shubik [15]
150. Slow Tit For Two Tats [4]
151. Slow Tit For Two Tats 2 [1]
152. Sneaky Tit For Tat [4]
153. Soft Go By Majority [17, 48]
154. Soft Go By Majority 10 [4]
155. Soft Go By Majority 20 [4]
156. Soft Go By Majority 40 [4]
157. Soft Go By Majority 5 [4]
158. Soft Grudger [44]
159. Soft Joss [1]
160. SolutionB1 [9]
161. SolutionB5 [9]
162. Spiteful Tit For Tat [1]
163. Stalker [23]
164. Stein and Rapoport [15]
165. Stochastic Cooperator [6]
166. Stochastic WSLS [4]
167. Suspicious Tit For Tat [19,
37]
168. TF1 [4]
169. TF2 [4]
170. TF3 [4]
171. Tester [16]
172. ThueMorse [4]
173. ThueMorseInverse [4]
174. Thumper [10]
175. Tit For 2 Tats (Tf2T) [17]
176. Tit For Tat (TfT) [15]
177. Tricky Cooperator [4]
178. Tricky Defector [4]
179. Tullock [15]
180. Two Tits For Tat
(2TfT) [17]
181. VeryBad [24]
182. Willing [63]
183. Win-Shift Lose-Stay
(WShLSt) [44]
184. Win-Stay Lose-Shift
(WSLS) [42, 51, 60]
185. Winner12 [46]
186. Winner21 [46]
187. Worse and Worse[1]
188. Worse and Worse 2[1]
189. Worse and Worse 3[1]
190. ZD-Extort-2 v2 [43]
191. ZD-Extort-2 [60]
192. ZD-Extort-4 [4]
193. ZD-GEN-2 [43]
194. ZD-GTFT-2 [60]
195. ZD-SET-2 [43]
C Correlation coefficients
A graphical representation of the correlation coefficients for the features in Table 8.
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CC_to_C_rate
CD_to_C_rate
DC_to_C_rate
DD_to_C_rate
SSE
Makes_use_of_game
Makes_use_of_length
Stochastic
Cooperation_rating
Cooperation_rating_max
Cooperation_rating_min
Cooperation_rating_median
Cooperation_rating_mean
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_max
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_min
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_median
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_mean
repetitions
size
turns
memory_usage
Normalized_Rank
Median_score
1 0.0640.16-0.29-0.44-0.16-0.19-0.120.540.00650.02-0.045-0.0140.54-0.260.550.550.0011-0.00320.0270.023-0.5 0.5
0.064 1 0.0350.290.29-0.16-0.24-0.160.450.0110.011-0.022-0.000570.44-0.130.450.45-0.0015-0.00140.011-0.0130.23-0.2
0.160.035 1 0.0940.098-0.085-0.190.0230.280.00044-0.006-0.037-0.020.28-0.140.290.29-0.00066.00540.0034-0.0420.13-0.1
-0.290.290.094 1 0.88-0.12-0.21-0.00780.19-0.0043.0088-0.023-0.00420.19-0.0750.20.19-0.00067- .0047-0.012-0.0710.41-0.4
-0.440.290.0980.88 1 -0.12-0.16-0.0620.15-0.00530.011-0.0086.00620.15-0.0540.150.150.00024-0.0059-0.015-0.0860.47-0.45
-0.16-0.16-0.085-0.12-0.12 1 0.650.57-0.190.00044-0.0097-0.0025-0.0058-0.190.18-0.19-0.19-0.00048.0047.000340.028-0.0031-0.022
-0.19-0.24-0.19-0.21-0.160.65 1 0.37-0.22-0.0039-0.0072-0.0031-0.0087-0.220.2-0.23-0.230.00018.0025.000310.089-0.150.12
-0.12-0.160.023-0.0078-0.0620.570.37 1-0.0870.0066-0.01.0021-0.00044-0.0870.082-0.09-0.089-0.00038.00634.5e-05.010.0057-0.024
0.540.450.280.190.15-0.19-0.22-0.0871 0.0360.0590.140.16 1 -0.290.980.99-0.0014-0.0046-0.0750.013-0.320.38
0.00650.0110.00044-0.0043-0.0053.00044-0.0039.00660.036 1 -0.150.210.23-0.02-0.13-0.0076.5e-18-0.000370.46-0.0250.012-7.8e-180.049
0.020.011-0.006.00880.011-0.0097-0.0072-0.010.059-0.15 1 0.210.380.0690.50.017- .7e-180.0079-0.32-0.0910.00431.5e-180.084
-0.045-0.022-0.037-0.023-0.0086-0.0025-0.0031.00210.140.210.21 1 0.920.130.067-0.052-8.8e-18-0.0160.049-0.470.14.6e-180.21
-0.014-0.00057-0.02-0.0042.0062-0.0058-0.0087- .000440.160.230.380.92 1 0.150.15-0.0243.2e-18-0.0089-0.029-0.480.079-1.7e-180.23
0.540.440.280.190.15-0.19-0.22-0.0871 -0.020.0690.130.15 1 -0.280.980.99-0.0014-0.031-0.0740.013-0.320.38
-0.26-0.13-0.14-0.075-0.0540.180.20.082-0.29-0.130.50.0670.15-0.28 1 -0.3-0.310.0063-0.24-0.0460.0240.11-0.08
0.550.450.290.20.15-0.19-0.23-0.090.98-0.007.017-0.052-0.0240.98-0.3 1 10.0016-0.0170.016-0.0064-0.330.35
0.550.450.290.190.15-0.19-0.23-0.0890.996.5e-18-1.7e-18-8.8e-183.2e-180.99-0.31 1 12.1e-177.8e-18-1.1e-17-0.00028-0.330.36
0.0011-0.0015- .00066-0.00067.00024- .00048.00018- .00038- .0014- .00037.0079-0.016-0.0089-0.0014.00630.00162.1e-171-0.0087.0052-0.00332.5e-18-0.0015
-0.0032-0.0014.0054-0.0047-0.0059.00470.00250.0063-0.00460.46-0.320.049-0.029-0.031-0.24-0.0177.8e-18-0.00871 0.056-0.000631e-17-0.0093
0.0270.0110.0034-0.012-0.015.000340.000314.5e-05.075-0.025-0.091-0.47-0.48-0.074-0.0460.016- .1e-170.00520.056 1-0.0648.5e-19-0.12
0.023-0.013-0.042-0.071-0.0860.0280.0890.010.0130.0120.00430.10.0790.0130.024-0.0064- .00028- .0033- .00063-0.0641-0.0840.095
-0.50.230.130.410.47-0.0031-0.150.0057-0.32-7.8e-181.5e-184.6e-18-1.7e-18-0.320.11-0.33-0.332.5e-18e-178.5e-190.0841 -0.94
0.5 -0.2-0.1-0.4-0.45-0.0220.12-0.0240.380.0490.0840.210.230.38-0.080.350.36-0.0015-0.0093-0.120.095-0.94 1
0.8
0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
Figure 21: Correlation coefficients of features in Table 8 for standard tournaments
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CC_to_C_rate
CD_to_C_rate
DC_to_C_rate
DD_to_C_rate
SSE
Makes_use_of_game
Makes_use_of_length
Stochastic
Cooperation_rating
Cooperation_rating_max
Cooperation_rating_min
Cooperation_rating_median
Cooperation_rating_mean
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_max
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_min
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_median
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_mean
repetitions
size
noise
turns
memory_usage
Normalized_Rank
Median_score
1 0.120.49-0.012-0.18-0.0150.03-0.0480.560.18-0.18-0.0054-0.0430.36-0.420.50.58-0.0024- .00033-0.290.00390.0070.41-0.5
0.12 1 0.130.660.66-0.018-0.0074-0.030.650.094-0.0920.190.270.48-0.380.540.610.00620.00410.460.0043.000110.46-0.33
0.490.13 1 0.20.190.0450.0140.0660.65-0.140.140.0065-0.0110.6-0.160.580.67-0.007.00076-0.160.0035-0.0270.51-0.5
-0.0120.660.2 1 0.90.0260.0140.0380.66-0.0660.0670.150.220.57-0.230.550.620.00180.00240.380.0018-0.0210.53-0.44
-0.180.660.190.9 10.0330.00770.0580.550.12-0.120.190.260.38-0.350.460.510.00460.0050.410.0031-0.0320.46-0.34
-0.015-0.0180.0450.0260.0331 0.650.570.014-0.00049.00022-0.001-0.001.0110.0340.00670.0072- .000470.0047-7.9e-060. 00340.0280.025-0.082
0.03-0.00740.0140.0140.00770.65 1 0.370.022-0.00019-0.00013-0.003- .00250.0170.030.0120.0092.00018.0025- .00027.000310.0890.0084-0.13
-0.048-0.030.0660.0380.0580.570.37 10.0120.00014- .00025.000278.3e-050.0091-0.0081.00860.011-0.000380.00632.8e-053.8e-05.010.022-0.026
0.560.650.650.660.550.0140.0220.01210.029-0.0230.230.240.79-0.440.860.960.00065.00170.11-0.0280.0080.71-0.68
0.180.094-0.14-0.0660.12-0.00049-0.00019.000140.0291 -0.990.110.12-0.57-0.850.00681.7e-170.0140.0360.0140.0160.000961.2e-190.023
-0.18-0.0920.140.067-0.120.00022- .00013-0.00025-0.023-0.99 1-0.094-0.0960.570.85-0.0065-1.7e-17-0.014-0.039-0.016-0.019-0.000521. e-180.017
-0.00540.190.00650.150.19-0.001-0.003.000270.230.11-0.0941 0.930.13-0.18-0.0647.6e-180.0040.00530.28-0.190.022-3.4e-180.24
-0.0430.27-0.0110.220.26-0.001- .00258.3e-05.240.12-0.0960.93 1 0.14-0.19-0.017-1. e-180.00270.00710.46-0.110.011- .8e-180.27
0.360.480.60.570.380.0110.0170.00910.79-0.570.570.130.14 1 0.130.690.78-0.0082-0.020.089-0.03.00590.62-0.55
-0.42-0.38-0.16-0.23-0.350.0340.03-0.0081-0.44-0.850.85-0.18-0.190.13 1 -0.37-0.41-0.012-0.039-0.0690.00210.013-0.360.25
0.50.540.580.550.460.00670.0120.00860.860.0068-0.0065-0.064-0.0170.69-0.37 1 0.910.0033-0.00250.0360.0110.010.65-0.67
0.580.610.670.620.510.00720.00920.0110.961.7e-17-1. e-177.6e-18-1.7e-180.78-0.410.91 1-1.4e-17-8.7e-18-4.9e-186.6e-190.00210.73-0.74
-0.0024.0062-0.0070.00180.0046- .00047.00018- .00038.000650.014-0.014-0.0040.0027-0.0082-0.0120.0033-1.4e-171-0.00870.0130.0052-0.0033-2e-180.0027
-0.000330.0041.00076.00240.005.00470.00250.00630.00170.036-0.0390.00530.0071-0.02-0.039-0.0025-8.7e-18-0.008710.00770.056-0.00062-1. e-170.0017
-0.290.46-0.160.380.41-7.9e-06-0. 00272.8e-05.110.014-0.0160.280.460.089-0.0690.036-4.9e-180.0130.00771-0.00370.00096-6.9e-190.21
0.00390.00430.00350.00180.0031.000340.000313.8e-05.0280.016-0.019-0.19-0.11-0.03.00210.0116.6e-190.00520.056-0.00371-0.064-1.7e-18-0.024
0.0070.00011-0.027-0.021-0.0320.0280.0890.010.0080.00096- .00052.0220.0110.00590.0130.010.0021-0.0033- .00062.00096-0.0641-0.0074-0.016
0.410.460.510.530.460.0250.00840.0220.711.2e-191.5e-18-3.4e-18-1.8e-180.62-0.360.650.73-2e-18-1.6e-17-6.9e-19-1.7e-18-0.00741 -0.68
-0.5-0.33-0.5-0.44-0.34-0.082-0.13-0.026-0.680.023-0.0170.240.27-0.550.25-0.67-0.740.00270.00170.21-0.024-0.016-0.68 1
0.8
0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
Figure 22: Correlation coefficients of features in Table 8 for noisy tournaments
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SSE
Makes_use_of_game
Makes_use_of_length
Stochastic
Cooperation_rating
Cooperation_rating_max
Cooperation_rating_min
Cooperation_rating_median
Cooperation_rating_mean
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_max
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_min
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_median
Cooperation_rating_comp_to_mean
repetitions
size
probend
Normalized_Rank
Median_score
1 0.0920.19-0.26-0.41-0.13-0.14-0.0620.50.00770.012-0.00860.00560.5-0.120.520.510.00023.0049-0.0210.41-0.32
0.092 1-0.0460.230.27-0.13-0.17-0.0910.110.016-0.00930.030.030.11-0.0480.120.11-0.00910.0130.0240.32-0.017
0.19-0.0461 0.120.12-0.058-0.170.0260.0540.0047-0.0099-0.034-0.0280.054-0.0760.0780.0690.00290.028-0.051-0.0180.033
-0.260.230.12 1 0.89-0.037-0.170.0084-0.170.0014-0.0049-0.015-0.014-0.17-0.011-0.15-0.160.000710.02-0.028-0.10.18
-0.410.270.120.89 1-0.064-0.16-0.054-0.210.0076-0.00990.0480.041-0.21-0.0085-0.21-0.21-0.00510.0110.045-0.160.22
-0.13-0.13-0.058-0.037-0.0641 0.650.570.0410.0029-0.0017-1.4e-050.00240.0410.00580.030.034-0.00047.0047-0.00019-0.053-0.11
-0.14-0.17-0.17-0.17-0.160.65 1 0.370.0230.0021.000121.6e-050.000870.0230.0130.0120.0170.00018.0025-0.00044-0.046-0.081
-0.062-0.0910.0260.0084-0.0540.570.37 1 0.10.0066-0.005.00220.00640.1-0.0010.0970.1-0.00038.0063.00033.0023-0.13
0.50.110.054-0.17-0.210.0410.0230.1 1 0.0410.00720.170.19 1 -0.220.950.980.00094.00280.160.71-0.83
0.00770.0160.00470.00140.00760.00290.00210.00660.041 1 -0.190.20.220.023-0.16-0.016-2.1e-180.00290.20.14-2.1e-180.046
0.012-0.0093-0.0099-0.0049-0.0099-0.0017.00012-0.005.0072-0.19 1 -0.110.0380.0110.650.0394.9e-180.0055-0.36-0.17-5.9e-190.0073
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0.0
0.4
0.8
Figure 23: Correlation coefficients of features in Table 8 for probabilistic ending tournaments
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0.180.087-0.019-0.00630.13-0.00059-0.00013-7.4e-060.055 1 -0.990.120.092-0.46-0.780.051-9.1e-180.00530.0370.031-0.00971.2e-18-0.0039
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-0.11-0.11-0.12-0.11-0.11-0.00047.00018- .00038- .0065.0053-0.0048-0.011-0.011-0.0061.0041.000918.6e-191-0.0087.00470.013-2e-180.0083
0.0160.0150.00990.0160.00340.00470.00250.0063.000530.037-0.0440.00230.0009-0.018-0.035-0.00244.7e-18-0.00871-0.00057.0077-1.6e-170.00061
0.310.320.370.340.36-0.00019-0.00044.00033-0.030.031-0.037-0.042-0.051-0.0450.0760.083-1.3e-170.0047-0.000571 0.023. e-180.058
-0.310.28-0.340.10.17-7.9e-06-0. 00272.8e-05-0.52-0.0097-0.044-0.85-0.88-0.450.220.14-1.8e-170.0130.00770.023 1-6.9e-19-0.65
0.260.20.340.380.30.0130.0150.0210.581.2e-18-7.9e-19-9.3e-201.3e-180.54-0.370.330.65-2e-18- .6e-172.3e-18-6.9e-191 -0.52
0.022-0.22-0.016-0.26-0.26-0.016-0.018-0.013-0.14-0.00390.0410.670.69-0.120.11-0.47-0.62-0.0083.00061-0.058-0.65-0.52 1
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0.8
Figure 24: Correlation coefficients of features in Table 8 for noisy probabilistic ending tournaments
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0.04 1 0.0440.390.41-0.091-0.12-0.0820.18-0.0830.079-0.12-0.120.230.0210.210.28-0.0230.0070.28-0.18
0.240.044 1 0.170.17-0.035-0.110.0290.23-0.0560.0580.0190.0220.27-0.0430.170.27-0.0230.0130.17-0.088
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0.37-0.083-0.056-0.27-0.074-0.00019- .000180.000320.3 1 -0.970.610.61-0.22-0.9-0.074-8.5e-190.00440.034-6.6e-180.28
-0.350.0790.0580.260.07-0.00066- .00051-0.0012-0.28-0.97 1 -0.57-0.560.24 0.90.0713.4e-180.0032-0.07-3.6e-18-0.25
0.34-0.120.019-0.24-0.091-0.00031- .000450.000480.490.61-0.57 1 0.990.19-0.64-0.19-7.6e-18-0.00340.0075-8.4e-190.54
0.35-0.120.022-0.24-0.093-0.00029- .000790.000710.490.61-0.560.99 1 0.2-0.64-0.18-2.6e-18-0.0026.00019-1.4e-180.55
0.380.230.270.130.064-0.029-0.040.0130.85-0.220.240.19 0.2 1 -0.0320.5 0.84-0.0034-0.0160.4-0.27
-0.440.021-0.0430.180.00970.0190.022-0.0019-0.48-0.9 0.9-0.64-0.64-0.032 1 -0.064-0.22-0.00051-0.062-0.16-0.19
0.220.210.170.170.13-0.032-0.037-0.00550.46-0.0740.071-0.19-0.180.5-0.064 1 0.740.0011-0.00480.29-0.4
0.430.280.270.160.12-0.042-0.0530.00330.83-8.5e-193.4e-18-7.6e-18-2.6e-180.84-0.220.74 17.1e-18-1.3e-180.43-0.44
-0.02-0.023-0.023-0.019-0.024-0.000470.00018- .00038-0.00130.0044-0.0032-0.0034-0.0026-0.0034-0.00051.00117. e-181-0.00872.9e-190.0013
0.00350.0070.0130.00810.00320.00470.00250.00639.4e-05.034-0.070.00750.00019-0.016-0.062-0.0048-1.3e-18-0.00871-1.1e-17-0.00065
0.110.280.170.240.23-0.0044-0.0440.0130.36- .6e-18-3.6e-18-8.4e-19-1.4e-180.4-0.160.290.432.9e-19-1.1e-171 -0.63
0.081-0.18-0.088-0.24-0.17-0.053-0.028-0.048-0.120.28-0.250.540.55-0.27-0.19-0.4-0.44-0.0013-0.00065-0.63 1
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Figure 25: Correlation coefficients of features in Table 8 for data set
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